Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs

1996

American Rural Cellular, Inc., a Delaware
Corporation v. Systems Communication
Corporation, a Utah Corporation, and Neal M
Sorensen, an individual : Brief of Appellee
Utah Court of Appeals

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Gayle McKeachnie; Clark B. Allred; McKeachnie & Allred; Attorneys for Defendants/Appellees.
Andrew M. Morse; Julianne P. Blanch; Snow, Christensen & Martineau; Attorneys for PlaintiffAppellant.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellee, American Rural Cellular v. Systems Communication Corporation, No. 960335 (Utah Court of Appeals, 1996).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2/267

This Brief of Appellee is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of
Appeals Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

AMERICAN RURAL CELLULAR, INC.,
a Delaware Corporation
Plaintiff/Appellant,
vs.
SYSTEMS COMMUNICATION
CORPORATION, a Utah Corporation,
and NEAL M SORENSEN, an individual,

Case No. 960335-CA
Priority 15

Defendants/Appellees.
BRIEF OF DEFENDANTS/APPELLEES
SYSTEMS COMMUNICATION CORPORATION AND NEAL M SORENSEN
Appeal from the Eighth Judicial District Court
of Uintah County, State of Utah
The Honorable John R. Anderson, District Judge

GAYLE F. McKEACHNIE - 2200
CLARK B. ALLRED - 0055
McKEACHNIE & ALLRED, P.C.
121 West Main Street
Vernal, Utah 84078
Telephone: (801)789-4908
Attorneys for Defendants/Appellees
ANDREW M. MORSE - A4498
JULIANNE P. BLANCH - A6495
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU
10 Exchange Place, Eleventh Floor
P.O. Box 45000
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145
Telephone: (801) 521-9000
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Appellant

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

AMERICAN RURAL CELLULAR, INC.,
a Delaware Corporation
Plaintiff/Appellant,
vs.
SYSTEMS COMMUNICATION
CORPORATION, a Utah Corporation,
and NEAL M SORENSEN, an individual,

Case No. 960335-CA
Priority 15

Defendants/Appellees.
BRIEF OF DEFENDANTS/APPELLEES
SYSTEMS COMMUNICATION CORPORATION AND NEAL M SORENSEN
Appeal from the Eighth Judicial District Court
of Uintah County, State of Utah
The Honorable John R. Anderson, District Judge

GAYLE F. McKEACHNIE - 22 00
CLARK B. ALLRED - 0055
McKEACHNIE & ALLRED, P.C.
121 West Main Street
Vernal, Utah 84078
Telephone: (801)789-4908
Attorneys for Defendants/Appellees
ANDREW M. MORSE - A4498
JULIANNE P. BLANCH - A6495
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU
10 Exchange Place, Eleventh Floor
P.O. Box 45000
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145
Telephone: (801) 521-9000
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Appellant

TABLE OF CONTENTS
PAGE
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

iii

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION

1

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW

1

STANDARD OF REVIEW

1

STATUTES AND REGULATIONS

.

3

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

6

A.
B.

6

Nature of the Case
Course of Proceedings and Disposition at Trial
Court

6

STATEMENT OF FACTS

7

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

18

ARGUMENT
I.

18
THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDING THAT SYSCOM WAS NOT A
CONTRACTOR UNDER THE LICENSING STATUTE IS SUPPORTED
BY THE EVIDENCE IN THE CASE. EVEN IF SYSCOM WERE A
CONTRACTOR, IT QUALIFIES FOR STATUTORY AND COMMON
LAW EXCEPTIONS

18

A. Defendant, Svscom is not a contractor as
that term is used in the Construction Trades
Licensing Act.

18

B. American Rural Cellular Inc. is not in the
class of persons sought to be protected by the
licensing requirement.

22

C.
Syscom is federally licensed to install
and operate radio equipment.

24

D. The bulk of the construction work done on
these sites was done by Dennis Martinsen, a
licensed contractor.

24

i

E. The Trial Court Correctly Held That Svscom
and the Enterprise Jointly Built By Syscom and
ARC Was a Telephone Company Specifically
Exempt
From
the
Contractor
Licensing
Requirement

25

THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY SAW ARC'S ATTEMPT TO
RECUSE THE TRIAL COURT AS A LITIGATION TACTIC
CALCULATED TO GET A NEW TRIAL AND CONCLUDED THAT
ARC'S WAITING UNTIL RECEIVING AN UNFAVORABLE RULING
CONSTITUTED A WAIVER AND FURTHER THAT THE
REQUIREMENTS OF RULE 63(b) URCP WERE NOT MET . .

27

A. ARC did not follow Rule 63(b) of the Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure in attempting to
recuse Judge Anderson.

27

B. ARC'S Motion to Disqualify Judge Anderson
was not timely.

29

C. The motion to recuse Judge Anderson was
correctly denied because Judge Anderson had no
actual knowledge of the contract upon which
the Motion to Disqualify is predicated. . .

32

III. THE COURT PROPERLY REJECTED ARC'S ATTEMPT TO REOPEN
OR OBTAIN A NEW TRIAL BASED ON EVIDENCE DEVELOPED
AFTER THE TRIAL AND EVENTS OCCURRING AFTER THE
TRIAL

34

II.

IV.

SYSCOM IS ENTITLED TO ITS ATTORNEYS FEES AND COSTS
AS AWARDED BY THE DISTRICT COURT.

CONCLUSION

41

ADDENDUM
A.

39

Deposition of Neal M Sorensen

ii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
CASES
50 W.
1989)

PAGE
Broadway

v.

Redevelopment

Agency,

784

P.2d

1162

(Utah
2

4447 Associates v. First Security Financial, 889 P.2d 467
App. 1995)

(Utah
2

American Rural Cellular Inc. v. Systems Communications Corp.,
et al. , 890 P. 2d 1035 (Utah App. 1995)

22

Anderton v. Montgomery, 607 P.2d 828 (Utah 1980)

32

Birch v. Birch, 771 P.2d 1114 (Utah App. 1989)

30

Christenson v. Jewkes, 761 P.2d 1375 (Utah 1988)

3

Erikson v. Wasatch Manor, Inc., 802 P.2d 1323 (Utah App. 1990) 3
Fillmore Products v. Western States Paving, 561 P.2d 687 (Utah
1977)
22
George v. Oren Limited & Associates, 672 P.2d 732 (Utah 1983)
Govert Copier Painting v. Van Leeuwen, 801 P. 2d 163
1990)

(Utah App.
23

Grayson Roper Ltd. Partnership v. Finlinson, 782 P.2d 467
1989) ,
Hancock v. Planned Dev. Corp, 791 P.2d 183 (Utah 1990)
Heber Valley Truck v. Utah Coal & Energy, 611 P.2d
1980)
In re Disconnection
1983)

of Certain Territory,

668

(Utah
2

...
389

P. 2d 544

38
(Utah
23
(Utah
37

In re Estate of Justheim, 824 P.2d 432 (Utah App. 1991) . . . .
In re S.R. , 735 P.2d 53 (Utah 1987)
Jacobs v. Hafen. 875 P.2d 559 (Utah App. 1994)
iii

23

2
38
2

Jones, Waldo, et al. v. Dawson. 923 P.2d 1366 (Utah 1996) . . . 2
Lepasiotes v. Dinsdale, 121 Utah 359, 242 P.2d 297 (1952) . .

30

Lignell v. Berg, 593 P.2d 800 (Utah 1979)

23

Madsen v. Prudential Federal Savings and Loan Assn., 767 P.2d
538 (Utah 1988)
29, 31
Moon Lake Elec. Ass'n v. Ultrasvsterns, W. Constructors, Inc.,
767 P.2d 125 (Utah App. 1988)

37

Motivated Management International v. Robert L. Finney and
Isabelle Finney, 604 P.2d 467 (Utah, 1979)
22, 25
Onveabor v. Pro Roofing, Inc.. 787 P.2d 525 (Utah App. 1990)

30

Powers v. Gene's Bldg. Materials, Inc., 567 P.2d 174 (Utah
1977)

37

Prudential
1990)

Capital

Group v. Mattson,

802 P. 2d

105

(Utah App.
2

Saunders v. Sharp, 806 P.2d 198 (Utah 1991)

2

Scharf v. BMG Corp., 700 P.2d 1068 (Utah 1985)

2

Schindler v. Schindler, 776 P.2d 84 (Utah App. 1989)

. . . .

37

Smith v. American Packing and Provision Co., 102 Utah 351, 130
P.2d 951 (1942)
23
Standard Federal Savings and Loan Assoc, v. Kirkbride, 821 P.2d
1136 (Utah 1991)
2
State ex rel. Division of Consumer Protection v. Rio Vista Oil,
Ltd. , 786 P.2d 1343 (Utah 1990)
2
Tangaro v. Marrero, 13 Utah 2d 290, 373 P.2d 390 (1962) . . .

37

Transamerica Cash Reserve, Inc. v. Dixie Power & Water, Inc.,
789 P.2d 24 (Utah 1990)

2

Wade v. Stangl, 869 P.2d 9 (Utah App. 1994)

iv

29

Wallich v. Salkin, 219 Cal App. 2d 157, 33 Cal. Reporter
(1963)

125
24

STATUTES
Utah Code Ann. § 38-1-18

4, 40

Utah Code Ann. § 54-2-1(19) (a)

3, 25

Utah Code Ann. § 54-2-1(29)

3, 26

Utah Code Ann. § 54-2-1(30)

4, 26

Utah Code Ann. § 58-55-6(7) (c)

3, 25, 27

Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2) (j)

1, 3

Utah Code Ann. § 78-7-1 (1) (c)

4, 32

OTHER AUTHORITIES
Form and Requirements of Certificate and Affidavit of
Disqualification of Trial Judge under 28 USC §144, 23 ALR Fed.
637 (1975)
30
Timeliness of Affidavit of Disqualification of Trial Judge
under 28 USC §144, 20 ALR Fed. 290 (1974)
Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 63 (b)

30
1, 2, 4, 2 7, 2 8

Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 59
5, 36-38
Waiver of Loss of Right to Disqualify Judge by Participation in
Proceedings, 24 ALR 4th 870 (1983)
30
Who is a "Contractor" Within Statutes Requiring the Licensing of,
or Imposing a License Tax Upon, a "Contractor"' Without Specifying
the Kinds of Contractors Involved, 19 ALR 3d 1407 (1968) . . 24

v

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction in this matter pursuant
to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(j).
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
1.

On appeal Plaintiff, American Rural Cellular (hereinafter

ARC), urges a version of facts contradictory to those found by the
Court to have been presented at trial. The primary issue on appeal
is whether, after marshalling all the evidence in support of the
trial court's Findings of Fact, the findings are against the clear
weight of the evidence.
2.

Whether

the

trial

court properly

concluded

that

ARC

should not be allowed to recuse the trial judge when it failed to
comply with Rule 63 (b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and
also waited until after ARC received an unfavorable ruling before
raising the claim of appearance of impropriety.
3.

Whether the trial court abused its discretion by refusing

to allow ARC a new trial more than two years after the trial, on
the assertion that new evidence has been developed.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
This

case

involved

a

two

day

trial

in

which

testimony and documents were received into evidence.

extensive
The court

made findings based on that evidence which ARC now challenges on
appeal.

In such a case, the standard of review is strictly limited
1

to whether, after marshalling all of the evidence in support of the
trial court's findings, the findings are so lacking in support as
to be against the clear weight of the evidence.

4447 Associates v.

First Security Financial, 889 P.2d 467, 471

(Utah App.

1995),

Jacobs v. Hafen, 875 P.2d 559, 561 (Utah App. 1994), Saunders v.
Sharp, 806 P.2d 198, 199 (Utah 1991), Prudential Capital Group v.
Matt son, 802 P.2d 105, 106

(Utah App. 1990), 5 0 W. Broadway v.

Redevelopment Agency, 784 P.2d 1162, 1171 (Utah 1989) and Grayson
Roper Ltd. Partnership v. Finlinson, 782 P.2d 467, 470 (Utah 1989) .
On

issue

number

two,

whether

ARC

failed

to

follow

the

provisions of Rule 63 (b) and also waived its right to recuse the
Judge, the standard of review is correctness.

Jones, Waldo, et al.

v. Dawson, 923 P.2d 1366 (Utah 1996), Standard Federal Savings and
Loan

Assoc,

v.

Kirkbride,

821

P.2d

1136,

1137

(Utah

1991),

Transamerica Cash Reserve, Inc. v. Dixie Power & Water, Inc., 78 9
P.2d 24, 25-26

(Utah 1990), State ex rel. Division of Consumer

Protection v. Rio Vista Oil, Ltd.,

786 P.2d

1343, 1347

(Utah

1990), and Scharf v. BMG Corp., 700 P.2d 1068, 1070 (Utah 1985).
On issue number three, whether the court correctly refused to
grant a new trial, the standard is whether the court below abused
its discretion.

A trial court's grant or denial of a motion for a

new trial will not be overturned on appeal absent an abuse of
discretion.

In re Estate of Justheim, 824 P.2d 432, 433 (Utah App.
2

1991), Erikson v. Wasatch Manor, Inc.. 802 P.2d 1323, 1326-27 (Utah
App. 1990) and Christenson v. Jewkes, 761 P.2d 1375, 1377 (Utah
1988) .
STATUTES AND REGULATIONS
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(j)
(2) The Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction, including
jurisdiction of interlocutory appeals, over:
(j) cases transferred to the Court of Appeals from the
Supreme Court.
Utah Code Ann. § 58-55-6(7)(c)
(7) The following persons are excepted from licensure
under this chapter and may engage in the construction
trades subject to these circumstances and limitations:
(c) public utilities operating under the rule
of
the
Public
Service
Commission
on
construction work incidental to their own
business
Utah Code Ann. § 54-2-1(19)(a)
"Public Utility" includes every common carrier, gas
corporation, electrical corporation, wholesale electrical
cooperative,
telephone
corporation,
telegraph
corporation, water corporation, sewerage corporation,
heat corporation, independent energy producer not
described in Subsection (e), and warehouseman where the
service is performed for, or the commodity delivered to,
the public generally, or in the case of a gas corporation
or electrical corporation where the gas or electricity is
sold or furnished to any member or consumer within the
state for domestic, commercial, or industrial use.
Utah Code Ann. § 54-2-1(29)
"Telephone corporation" includes every corporation and
person, their lessees, trustees, and receivers, owning,
controlling, operating, or managing any telephone line
3

for public service within this state, provided, however,
that all corporations, partnerships, or firms providing
intrastate cellular telephone service shall cease to be
"telephone corporations" nine months after both the wireline and the nonwire-line cellular service providers have
been
issued
covering
licenses
by
the
Federal
Communications Commission.
It does not include any
person which provides, on a resale bases, any telephone
or telecommunication service which is purchased from a
telephone corporation.
Utah Code Ann. § 54-2-1(30)
"Telephone Line" includes all conduits, ducts, poles,
wires, cables, instruments, and appliances, and all other
real estate, fixtures, and personal property owned,
controlled, operated, or managed in connection with or to
facilitate communication by telephone whether that
communication is had with or without the use of
transmission wires.
Utah Code Ann. § 78-7-1(1) (c)
(1) Except by consent of all parties, no justice, judge, or
justice court judge may sit or act in any action or
proceeding:
(c) when he has been attorney or counsel for either party
in the action or proceeding.
Utah Code Ann. § 38-1-18
Except as provided in Section 38-11-107, in any action brought
to enforce any lien under this chapter the successful party
shall be entitled to recover a reasonable attorneys' fee, to
be fixed by the court, which shall be taxed as costs in the
action.
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 63(b)
(b) Disqualification.
Whenever a party to any action or
proceeding, civil or criminal, or his attorney shall make and
file an affidavit that the judge before whom such action or
proceeding is to be tried or heard has a bias or prejudice,
either against such party or his attorney or in favor of any
4

opposite party to the suit, such judge shall proceed no
further therein, except to call in another judge to hear and
determine the matter.
Every such affidavit shall state the facts and the reasons for
the belief that such bias or prejudice exists, and shall be
filed as soon as practicable after the case has been assigned
or such bias or prejudice is known. If the judge against whom
the affidavit is directed questions the sufficiency of the
affidavit, he shall enter an order directing that a copy
thereof be forthwith certified to another judge (naming him)
of the same court or of a court of like jurisdiction, which
judge shall then pass upon the legal sufficiency of the
affidavit.
If the judge against whom the affidavit is
directed does not question the legal sufficiency of the
affidavit, or if the judge to whom the affidavit is certified
finds that it is legally sufficient, another judge must be
called in to try the case or determine the matter in question.
No party shall be entitled in any case to file more than one
affidavit;
and no such affidavit shall be filed unless
accompanied by a certificate of counsel of record that such
affidavit and application are made in good faith.
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 59
(a) Grounds.
Subject to the provisions of Rule 61, a new
trial may be granted to all or any of the parties and on all
or part of the issues, for any of the following causes;
provided, however, that on a motion for a new trial in an
action tried without a jury, the court may open the judgment
if one has been entered, take additional testimony, amend
findings of fact and conclusions of law or make new findings
and conclusions, and direct the entry of a new judgment:
(4) Newly discovered evidence, material for the party
making the application, which he could not,
wich
reasonable diligence, have discovered and produced at the
trial.
(b) Time for Motion. A motion for a new trial shall be served
not later than 10 days after the entry of the judgment.
(c) Affidavits; Time for Filing. When the application for a
new trial is made under Subdivision (a) (1), (2), (3), or (4),
it shall be supported by affidavit. Whenever a motion for a
new trial is based upon affidavits they shall be served with

5

the motion. The opposing party has 10 days after such service
within which to serve opposing affidavits. The time within
which the affidavits or opposing affidavits shall be served
may be extended for an additional period not exceeding 2 0 days
either by the court for good cause shown or by the parties by
written stipulation. The court may permit reply affidavits.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A,

Nature of the Case,
ARC

hired

Defendant,

Systems

Communication

Corporation

(hereinafter Syscom) to work with it in building and operating a
cellular

telephone

company.

Syscom was to be

compensated

by

payment of a "service fee" of $10,000.00 per month both during the
building and the operation of the company.

Syscom was also to

receive 10% of the gross revenue and 5% of the sales price when the
company is sold.

Before the facilities were even completed, ARC

ceased normal communications with Syscom and filed this action to
terminate

the

agreement.

Syscom

counterclaimed

rendered and monies advanced and unpaid.

for

services

ARC admitted that the

monies were owed, that the work was satisfactory, but

claimed

Syscom should not recover because it was not a licensed contractor.
B.

Course of Proceedings and Disposition at Trial Court,
A two day trial to the court was held.

The trial court

terminated the parties' agreements and entered judgment for the
monies owed to Syscom.

ARC appealed the trial court's Judgment to

the Utah Court of Appeals.

The Court of Appeals remanded with

instruction to the trial court to make additional and more specific
6

Findings

of

Fact.

The

trial

court

reviewed

the

file,

the

transcript of the trial, proposed findings and other input from
counsel, and the courts notes from the trial and made extensive
additional findings consisting of sixty-three separate paragraphs
and Conclusions of Law, and entered a Judgment based on those
findings.

ARC then filed motions to recuse counsel for Syscom, to

recuse the Judge and to reopen the case or grant a new trial.
motions were denied.

All

This appeal followed.
STATEMENT OF FACTS

Syscom adopts as its statement of facts, the facts found by
the court and included in its signed Findings of Fact.

Pertinent

parts of those findings are set forth below.
1.

The Plaintiff, American Rural Cellular, Inc. (ARC), is a

Delaware Corporation which has experience in constructing cellular
telephone systems in Florida and in Pennsylvania.
R. 320).
2.

(T. 3, 266-267,

(Finding of Fact No.l).
In 1989, ARC won a Federal Communications

Commission

(FCC) lottery which entitled it to construct and operate a cellular
telephone system in eastern Utah.

(T. 11, 234, 252) . (Finding of

Fact No. 2 ) .
3.

ARC was required to have part of the telephone system

built and in operation by a specific date or it would forfeit the
FCC license.

(T. 106, 150-151, 236). (Finding of Fact No. 3 ) .
7

4.

Defendant/Counterclaimant,

Systems

Communications

Corporation, (Syscom) is a Utah Corporation operating in eastern
Utah.

(T. 4, 232).
5.

(Finding of Fact No. 4 ) .

Syscom is a wireless telephone and radio communication

company which

is

in the business of building,

equipping,

and

operating radio and telephone transmission towers for its telephone
and radio customers.
6.

7.

(Finding of Fact No. 5 ) .

Defendants hold NABER certified two-way radio technician

licenses numbered
Hauer).

(T. 232).

1868

(Neal M. Sorensen) and 1869

(Rodney D.

(T. 230, Ex. 1 and 75). (Finding of Fact No. 6 ) .
In 1989, Plaintiff approached Defendant Neal Sorensen,

President of Systems Communications Corporation, seeking help in
constructing and operating the cellular telephone system it had
obtained a license for in the FCC lottery.

(T. 11-12, 232-234).

(Finding of Fact No. 7 ) .
8.

ARC also sought Syscom's help in finding money with which

to build the system.
9.

(T. 24, 243).

(Finding of Fact No. 8 ) .

ARC first hired a law firm and engineering firm from the

eastern United States to design and construct the system.

(T. 12,

39, 234-235, 237). (Finding of Fact No. 9 ) .
10.

When ARC had a falling out with the law and engineering

firm, ARC came to Mr. Sorensen at Syscom, and asked for help in
putting in place the physical facilities, arranging licenses, and
8

interconnects, and operating the cellular telephone system.
237) .

(T.

(Finding of Fact No. 10) .

11.
creating

ARC came to Syscom for help in saving the FCC license and
the

cellular

telephone

company

because

of

Syscom's

experience and expertise in building and operating telephone and
radio communication systems.

(T. 20-21, 236-237) . Finding of Fact

No. 11).
12.

Syscom did not hold itself out as a licensed contractor

in the construction trades and ARC did not come to Syscom because
it considered it a licensed contractor.

(T. 21, 94, 235) .

The

people initially hired by ARC to create the telephone company were
not licensed contractors in Utah, or any other state, but rather
were attorneys and engineers.

(T. 233-235) .

(Finding of Fact No.

12) .
13.

Syscom agreed to help and commenced immediately working

with ARC'S engineers and others on selecting sites for radio towers
and other facilities and introduced ARC to Motorola, which agreed
to provide the money for the acquisition of the equipment and
construction of the facilities in which the equipment would be
placed.
14.

(T. 234, 243).

(Finding of Fact No. 13).

Mr. Sorensen, under guidance and direction from engineers

hired by ARC, located lands for cell sites, secured the lands, and

9

hired

contractors

to construct buildings.

(T. 234, 248-249).

(Finding of Fact No. 14).
15.

Uintah Engineering and Land Surveying, Inc. was hired to

do surveying in establishing corners and locating the sites where
the different facilities were to be constructed.

(T. 242-243).

(Finding of Fact No. 15) .
16.

Dennis Martinsen, working under the Utah

Contractors

license of Martinsen Construction License number 0000151826, did
the construction of the buildings and the base for the towers. The
electrical

work was performed by D & D Electric, which holds

license No. 0000444360.

Any work performed by Syscom employees on

the buildings, was under the direction and control of Martinsen.
(T. 183, 227-228, R. 317-318).
17.

Syscom

erected

(Finding of Fact No. 16).

the

radio

towers

pursuant

to

the

specifications of Plaintiff's engineers and in accordance with FCC
regulations.

Plaintiff obtained the necessary permits from the FCC

since Plaintiff was the holder of the cellular license.
253).

(T. 251-

(Finding of Fact No. 17).
18.

Eventually, Syscom and ARC signed a sales agreement which

provided that Syscom would sell telephone equipment for ARC on a
commission basis.

(T. 55, 127).

10

(Finding of Fact No. 18).

19.

Syscom made sales of cellular equipment under the sales

agreement, but has not been paid $2,3 96.72 owing it under the terms
of that agreement.
20.

ARC

(Ex. 30 and 31).

had

Neal

Sorensen

(Finding of Fact No. 19).
of

Systems

Communications

Corporation, attend training in several cities at ARC'S expense.
(T. 125-126).
21.

(Finding of Fact No. 20).

After Syscom began its work, Syscom and ARC

started

working on agreements to put in writing their respective duties,
rights, and responsibilities with respect to the construction,
operation, maintenance, and rights to income from the system.
12-13, 244-245).
22.

(T.

(Finding of Fact No. 21).

As the work progressed, a document entitled "Management

Agreement" was drafted by ARC, setting forth its proposal about how
the parties would construct

and manage the cellular

telephone

system authorized by the FCC, and how profits would be divided.
(T. 244-245).
23.

(Finding of Fact No. 22).

The recitals of the Management Agreement, particularly

Paragraph B, recite that Syscom has been in the
business

for

more

than

nine

years

having

communication

engaged

in

the

installation and servicing of two-way and microwave equipment, the
operation

of

a

private

paging

system,

and

the

leasing

of

communication sites to private radio licensees, and thereby has
acquired considerable business experience, name familiarity, and
11

business knowledge in the telecommunications industry in the Permit
Area.

(Ex. 1 and 75).
24.

(Finding of Fact No. 23) .

The Management Agreement also provides in Paragraph C of

the Recitals on the first page of the Management Agreement that
Syscom holds an FCC private radio license and is accredited by the
National Association of Business and Radio Users.

Paragraph E of

the Agreement, provides that ARC wanted to take advantage of the
knowledge, experience, business and community context and assets of
Syscom in order to engage in the business of providing cellular
radio telecommunication services in the Permit Area.
75) .

(Ex. 1 and

(Finding of Fact No. 24) .
25.

The Management Agreement does not recite that Syscom is

a licensed contractor, nor did Syscom represent in any other way
that it was licensed as a construction contractor. (Ex. 1 and 75) .
(Finding of Fact No. 25) .
26.

The contract outlines the general duties of Syscom and

particularly Paragraph 2(b) lists things which Syscom should do.
(Ex. 1 and 75) .
27.

(Finding of Fact No. 26) .

Syscom's

duties

"under

ARC'S

exclusive

right

of

unfettered control over business assets, facilities, operations,
and policy decisions," was

to do the things

as set

forth

in

Paragraphs 3(a), (b), (c), (d), (e), (f), (g), (h), (i), (j), (k),
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and (1). Syscom worked on each of those areas of responsibility.
(T. 250-257, 265-266, 303).
28.

(Finding of Fact No. 27).

ARC, under the contract Section 5(b), was to execute such

contracts as are recommended by Syscom and approved by ARC for the
construction, maintenance and lawful operation of the cellular
telecommunication system in the Permit Area.
done.

(T. 266), (Ex. 1 and 75), (R. at 319-323).

This is what was
(Finding of Fact

No. 28).
29.

Syscom reviewed the proposed agreement and revised it

sending it back to ARC. Several drafts of the Management Agreement
were passed back and forth.

(T. 237-238).

(Finding of Fact No.

29) .
30.

The work of putting

together

the cellular

telephone

company progressed and eventually, as the initial phase of setting
up

the

cellular

telephone

system

completion,

one

version of a Management Agreement was signed by Plaintiff

and

another was signed by Defendant.

was

nearing

The parties went forward with the

work as if they had agreed to the terms embodied in the Management
Agreement.
31.

(T. 244-245, 247, 280-282).

(Finding of Fact No. 30).

Under the terms of the Management Agreement, Syscom had

the responsibility to, "manage and implement the building of the
system

and

operating

it once

built".

Those

responsibilities

included operating, servicing, and maintaining all of the towers,
13

switches, terminals, and other facilities, sales and billing of
customers, negotiating interconnections, arrangements with local
wireline

telephone

procedures, and

systems,

establishing

written

operating

selecting, training, and supervising

technical

sales and administrative personnel and many other duties.
251, Ex. 1 and 75).
32.

(T. 248-

(Finding of Fact No. 31).

For performing these functions, ARC agreed to pay Syscom

a "service fee" of $10,000 per month plus 10% of the revenues from
the system, minus certain deductions for taxes. The $10,000.00 per
month management fee, although not called that by the parties, was
substantially

a

fee

management services.

for

radio

and

telephone

engineering

(T. 127, 240-241, Ex. 1 and 75) .

and

(Finding of

Fact No. 32).
33.

ARC reserved the right to execute all agreements for

construction, maintenance, and operation of the system.

Everything

that Syscom did was under ARC'S exclusive right of unfettered
control

over

decisions.
34.

business

assets,

(Ex. 1 and 75).

facilities,

operations,

and

(Finding of Fact No. 33).

Although the Management Agreement states that Syscom is

an independent contractor, the agreement also states that ARC had
the right to make all decisions and direct how the work was done in
putting together and operating the telephone company. The parties'
actions indicate their recognition that ARC was in total control
14

and could direct, and at times did direct, how work was to be
performed

and how the money was spent.

(T. 133, 134).

For

example, communications about the details of the work took place
nearly daily as the work progressed and ARC directed Syscom to
withdraw monies and send the money to ARC in Florida, which Syscom
did in a sum of $118,156.60.
269-273, Ex. 1 and 75).
35.
existed

(Finding of Fact No. 34).

In some ways, the relationship between the parties which
was

decisions.

principal-agent.

ARC

had

full

control

Syscom only had authority to recommend.

Ex. 1 and 75).
36.

(T. 39, 85, 105, 115-116, 244, 254,

in

all

(T. 247-248,

(Finding of Fact No. 35).

In other ways, it was as if the parties were partners.

Syscom put its own money into the project for telephone equipment
and advances for other things.

That, together with listing itself

as owner on building permit applications and sharing gross business
revenues and

sales profits, made the relationship between

parties like a partnership.
2 79, Ex. 1 and 75).
37.

the

(T. 88-89, 238-239, 247, 260, 278-

(Finding of Fact No. 36).

Part of the money to be received by Syscom was ten (10%)

percent of gross revenue and in the event the cellular telephone
system is sold, Syscom is to receive five (5%) percent of the sales
price.

(T. 128, 247, Ex. 1 and 75).
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(Finding of Fact No. 37).

38.

As Syscom went to work to put together the telephone

company, Neal Sorensen and Marie Bagshaw, the contact person Syscom
had with ARC, talked on the telephone three or four times a week,
if not more often.
39.

(T. 85, 244).

(Finding of Fact No. 38).

Syscom was to be paid a fee called a service fee for its

work in creating the new telephone company, which fee was the same
during the construction period and the operation period.
(Ex. 1 and 75).
40.
ceasing

(T. 122) ,

(Finding of Fact No. 39).

Plaintiff breached its covenant of good faith dealing by
to

communicate

with

the Defendant

when Defendant

attempting to finish the cell sites and operate the system.
failure

to

communicate

commenced

several

months

termination of the agreement by Plaintiff.
301).

prior

was
This

to

the

(T. 51, 86-87, 299-

(Finding of Fact No. 41).
41.

competing

Defendant
product,

breached
however

the

agreement

paragraph

seven

by
of

advertising
the

a

Management

Agreement recognized that there would be some conflict between
Systems Communications' existing radio business and the cellular
business and entered into the agreement with this knowledge and
expressed reference to that potential problem.
breach to be minor.

The Court finds the

(T. 276-278, Ex. 1 and 75).

No. 42).
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(Finding of Fact

42.

The

Defendant,

Systems

Communication

Corporation,

sincerely pursued the construction and management of the system in
anticipation of and reliance on future expectations of profit.
247).

(T.

(Finding of Fact No. 43).
43.

completed

The Plaintiff, American Rural Cellular, Inc., received a
and developed

system at a reasonable

satisfied with the product.

(T. 101, 106, 143).

price

and was

(Finding of Fact

No. 44) .
44.

The Sales Agency Agreement signed by the parties enabled

Syscom to participate in the sale of cellular telephones and states
that

it would do so as an independent

contractor.

(Ex. 23) .

(Finding of Fact No. 45).
45.

Syscom's opportunities and responsibilities under the

Sales Agent Agreement, involved the sale of cellular telephone
equipment and its compensation was a commission, based on sales.
(Ex. 23) .
46.
were

(Finding of Fact No. 50) .
Plaintiff was satisfied with how the buildings and towers

constructed.

(T.

106) .

Plaintiff

and

its

engineers

supervised Syscom and approved the disbursement of funds from the
various accounts.

(Ex 1 and 75).

17

(Finding of Fact No. 51).

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
I.
The trial court correctly decided that Syscom should be paid
for its services in managing and implementing the installation and
operation of the cellular telephone system.
II.
ARC'S motions to recuse the judge, to recuse opposing counsel
and for a new trial were not timely, did not comply with the Rules
of Civil Procedure and were properly denied.
III.
The award of attorneys fees by the trial court was required
both

by

the

contract

between

the

parties

and

the

statutory

provisions governing mechanics liens.
ARGUMENT
I.

THE TRIAL
UNDER THE
THE CASE.
STATUTORY

COURT'S FINDING THAT SYSCOM WAS NOT A CONTRACTOR
LICENSING STATUTE IS SUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE IN
EVEN IF SYSCOM WERE A CONTRACTOR, IT QUALIFIES FOR
AND COMMON LAW EXCEPTIONS.

A. Defendant, Svscom is not a contractor as that term is used
in the Construction Trades Licensing Act.
ARC'S argument, that the court erred when it concluded that
because Syscom was ARC'S agent it need not be licensed under the
Utah

Construction

Trades

misstates the issue.

Licensing

Act,

misses

the

mark

and

The court specifically found that Syscom was

not a contractor covered by the Act.
18

(R. 1319, 1324, 1327) . That

conclusion was based on specific Findings of Fact including the
following:
1.

Syscom's activities included sale of cellular telephone

equipment on a commission basis.
2.

(Ex. 23).

Syscom was to be paid a service fee for its work, which

the fee was the same during the construction and the operational
periods.
3.

(T. 122), (Ex. 1 and 75).
Part of the money to be received by Syscom was 10% of

gross revenue and 5% of sales price of the company.

(T. 128, 247,

Ex. 1 and 75).
4.

The parties talked on the telephone 3 or 4 times a week

in putting together the telephone company. (7.85, 244)
5.

Cellcom had full control in all decisions, Syscom only

had authority to recommend.

(T. 247-248, Ex. 1 and 75, T. 133 &

134) .
6.

ARC

directed

Syscom

to

withdraw

moneys

from

the

construction account and send those funds to ARC in Florida.

(T.

39, 85, 105, 115-116, 244, 254, 269-273, Ex. 1 & 75).
7.

ARC had the right to direct how the work was done in

putting together and operating the telephone company.
134) .

19

(T. 133,

8.

ARC reserved the right to execute all agreements for

construction, maintenance, and operation of the telephone company.
(Ex. 1 8c 75) .
9.

The

$10,000.00

management

fee was

engineering and management type service.

substantially

for

(T. 12 7, 240-241, Ex. 1

& 75) .
10.

Syscom's responsibilities included operating, servicing,

and maintaining all of the towers, switches, terminals, and other
facilities,

sales

interconnections

and

billing

arrangements

of

with

customers,
local

negotiating

telephone

systems

establishing written operating procedures, and selecting, training,
and supervising technical and administrative personnel.

(T. 248 -

251, Ex. 1 8c 75) .
The work which Syscom did and which it agreed to do under the
Management

Agreement

contractor.

was

not

that

of

being

a

construction

The Management Agreement recites the credentials ARC

looked to Syscom to provide in the project.

Paragraph E of the

Agreement states that ARC wanted to take advantage of the knowledge
and experience Syscom had in the telephone business gained from its
years

of

experience

in installing

equipment in the permit area.

and

servicing

(Ex. 1 and 75) .

communication

A reading of the

Management Agreement describes the services which Syscom was to
provide.

Syscom did not hold itself out as a construction trades
20

contractor either in the recitals of the Management Agreement nor
in any other way.

Syscom's compensation was a service fee which

was $10,000.00 per month both during the construction phase and the
operation phase of the term of the agreement.
to construct any part of the facilities.

Syscom did not bid

(T. 245-247), (R. 765-

676) . The contracts were to be entered into by Syscom on behalf of
ARC.

(Ex. 1, Paragraph 6.A(1)).
Syscom was to share in the revenues of the system and in the

event the system was sold, Syscom was to share in the sales price
of the system.

(Ex. 1 and 75) . In that sense, Syscom and ARC were

partners or had a profit-sharing arrangement.

The monies which

Syscom claims from ARC are for non-payment of the management fee
clearly spelled out in the Agreement and the services for which it
was to be paid.

The Agreement also indicates that ARC would pay

for the construction and the out-of-pocket expenses incurred by
Syscom.

(Ex. 1 and 75) .

The money in the bank accounts which

Syscom managed for ARC was furnished by ARC and Syscom simply acted
as the agent of ARC in performing the responsibilities set forth
under the Agreement.
The trial court specifically found that Syscom was not a
contractor

as that

Licensing Act.

term is used

in the Construction

Trades

This finding was based on the activities Syscom

performed and those called for under the Management Agreement.
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saic •:: r : .u r lilmore riodu,/ -. • •-*

this court has recognized the harshness of
declaring
contracts
of
non-licensees
void
or
unenforceable. . . It is inequitable and unjust to rule
as a matter of law on summary judgment that defendant can
take the benefit of plaintiff's labor and refuse 1_^ ^-^
22

The

for it. The general rule is that persons required to be
licensed will not have their bargains enforced.
The
general rules still permit the Court to consider the
merits of the particular case and avoid unreasonable
penalties and forfeitures.
Although many Courts yearn for a mechanically applicable
rule, they have not made one in the present instance.
Justice requires that the penalty should fit the crime;
and justice and sound policy do not always require the
enforcement of licensing statutes by large forfeitures
going not to the state but repudiating defendants. Id at
689
In this case, licensed contractors and professionals were
hired to survey, engineer, construct buildings and do electrical
work.

ARC

did

qualifications.

not

look

to

Syscom

for

those

skills

or

The Utah courts have held that unless it is shown

that the party against whom recovery is sought is within the class
of persons whom the licensing statute
recovery will not be allowed.

Govert

is designed to protect,
Copier Painting v.

Van

Leeuwen, 801 P.2d 163, 168 (UtahApp. 1990), George v. Oren Limited
& Associates, 672 P.2d 732, 735 (Utah 1983), Heber Valley Truck v.
Utah Coal & Energy, 611 P.2d 389, 391 (Utah 1980), Lignell v. Berg,
593 P.2d

800, 805

(Utah 1979),

Smith v. American Packing

and

Provision Co., 102 Utah 351, 130 P.2d 951 (1942).
In this case, ARC was in charge of the project, reserved the
right to make all decisions as to how the work proceeded and the
right to direct expenditures of moneys.
as an independent contractor.
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It did not rely on Syscom

C. Syscom is federally licensed to install and operate radio
equipment.
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The bulk of the construction work done on these sites was

done by Dennis Martinsen, a licensed contractor.
Dennis Martinsen, working und^r * he 1 Jtah Contractors licence.
M :t i' 1 .i nsen
construction • ;
electrical

rnnstruction
>..

L -r^.F^
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:

Wui:. \-.ir performed
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0000151826,
•

^.LecLj. ..c

>, . .

did the
n^

license No. 0000444360.

Any work performed by Syscom employees on

the buildings, was under the direction and control of Martinsen.
(T. 183, 227-228, R. 317-318).
Syscom's role was to erect the radio towers, which it was
licensed
indicating

to

do

that

under
if

federal

the

law.

protection

The
sought

cases

are

to

afforded

be

numerous
the

consumer is supplied in some other way, the defense of failure to
license will not be raised.

See Motivated Management International

v. Finney, supra.
E.
The Trial Court Correctly Held That Syscom and the
Enterprise Jointly Built By Syscom and ARC Was a Telephone
Company Specifically Exempt From the Contractor Licensing
Requirement.
Utah Code Annotated § 58-55-6 imposes the requirement of a
contractor's license.

Subparagraph (7) of that section lists the

exemptions and exceptions to that requirement.

It states:

The following persons are excepted from licensure under
this chapter and may engage in the construction trade
subject to these circumstances and limitations
• • • •

7(c) Public utilities operating under the rules of the
Public Service Commission on construction work incidental
to their own business.
Utah Code Ann. § 54-2-1(19) (a) defines the term Public Utility as
follows:
Public utility includes every common carrier, gas
corporation, electrical corporation, wholesale electric
25

cooperative .
corporat ior

telephone
corporation,
telegraph
'"nde-r I i ni ng suppl ied. )

Telephone corporation is defined •>; iM ah Code Ann, § 54 2-1:29) as
f ol lows ."Telephone corporation" includes ^ver;, corporation and
person, their lessees, trustees and receivers, owning,
controlling, operating, or managing any telephone line
for public service within this state,
Utah

' ru

.-,

'

'^l- il

• ]* * -' ~\s f^ll'^ws:

Telephone iin> "includes all conduits, viuct.j, poiey,
wires, cables instruments, and appliances, and all other
real estate, fixtures, and personal property owned,
controlled, operated, or managed in connection with or to
facilitate communication by telephone whether that
communication is had with or without the use of
transmission wires.
r>'

•-•, ^

i

: :rilities since they are telephone

companies operating .1 teiepii^i:*.- . m e .
Utah ^od^ :'^-1

' r.<l 2 ] 22

corpora:....-.

* he paragraph defining "telephone
-.;..-

cellular

companies are " telephone corporations" i:\

telephone

facing

....
provided
however
that
1 .. j.
corporations,
partnerships, or firms providing intrastate cellular
telephone
service
shall
cease
to
be
telephone
corporations nine months after both the wire-line and the
nonwi.re~l.ine cellular service providers have been issued
covering
licenses
by
the
Federal
Communications
Commi ssiori.
1 I...

.- : •"•'
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29 of the statute ' hat ARC and Syscorn woi:-;eJ so ".aiM ;.v_. ,,/;e:
construe: . :
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: '-6

\s

§ 54 -2-1 (29)

states, prior to issuance of the license ah I I hf »••>:•: | >i iat ivi I 2 nine
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months, the company is classified as a public utility in Utah.
After the passage of nine months from the issuance of the FCC
covering license, it is excluded from the definition of public
utilities because it is regulated by the FCC and under federal law.
As a public utility, Syscom and the system being constructed are
exempt from construction trade licensing for work incidental to the
business as provided in § 58-55-6(7) (c) .
A company providing cellular telephone service cannot cease to
be a telephone corporation nine months after licensing by the FCC
if it is not a telephone corporation prior to the expiration of
nine months.
The

trial

court

correctly

concluded on the basis of

the

undisputed evidence that Syscom, and the telephone system being
constructed by Syscom and ARC, were both public utilities and
exempt from the contractor licensing statute.
specifically

exempts

public

utilities

on

§ 58-55-6 (7) (c)
construction

work

incidental to their own business, which would certainly exempt the
work

connected

with

the

installation

of

the

communications

equipment which Syscom did in putting together the system with ARC.
II.

THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY SAW ARC'S ATTEMPT TO RECUSE
TRIAL COURT AS A LITIGATION TACTIC CALCULATED TO GET A
TRIAL AND CONCLUDED THAT ARC7 3 WAITING UNTIL RECEIVING
UNFAVORABLE RULING CONSTITUTED A WAIVER AND FURTHER THAT
REQUIREMENTS OF RULE 63(b) URCP WERE NOT MET.

THE
NEW
AN
THE

A. ARC did not follow Rule 63(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure in attempting to recuse Judge Anderson.
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ARC appeals the trial court's denial of ARC'S motion, to recuse
: :-;-rson.

*• '

I/HIK-V

The moti^r v

recuse was basec on <* claim

that". ARC had discovered an agre^»r.'-
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^w
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Rulf
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ui

until

uhe

when

A\.

interest

• h*

Utaix
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tor

•• * .

Svscom

•

aqreed
.

" idge A n d e i s o n
*

del s o n

did

to
n

who
not

notion,
of

Civil

Procedure

reads

as

follows:
Whenever a par~y to any action or proceeding, civil or
criminal, or his attorney shall make and file an
affidavit that the judge before whom such action or
proceeding is r o be tried or heard has a bias or
prejudice, either against such party or his attorney or
in favor of any opposite party to the suit, such judge
shall proceed no further therein, except to ca.1.1
another judge to hear and determine the matter.
Every such affidavit shall state tl: le facts and the
reasons for the belief that such bias or prejudice
exists, and shall be filed as soon as practicable after
the case has been assigned or such bias or prejudice is
known.
No party shall be entitled in any case to
file more than one affidavit; and no such affidavit shall
be filed unless accompanied, by a certificate ::>f counsel
of record that such affidavit and application aire made in
good f ai tl..
ARC did not file an affidavit as required by the Rule..

The

i: i i] e x ' ^ n . - ••-•-- • - ,ir a p a r t y a l l e g i n g j u d i c i a l b i a s o r p r e j u d i c e m u s t
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first file an affidavit to that effect.

Wade v. Stangl, 869 P.2d

9, 11 (Utah App. 1994).
Furthermore, ARC did not file a Certificate of Counsel of
Record that such affidavit and application are made in good faith.
If for no other reasons, the Motion to Disqualify Judge Anderson
was correctly denied for failure of ARC to follow the provisions of
the Rule involved in the process of disqualifying a judge.
There are reasons for the rule.

The affidavit should set

forth how and when the information came to the attention of the
party seeking disqualification and the certificate of counsel is
required to avoid frivolous disqualification proceedings.

Since

neither the affidavit nor the certificate as required by the rule
were filed in this case, there was good reason to go no further in
considering the requested disqualification.
B.

ARC'S Motion to Disqualify Judge Anderson was not timely.

Timeliness is essential in filing a motion to disqualify.

To

be timely, a motion to disqualify should be filed at counsel's
first opportunity after learning of the disqualifying facts.

See

Madsen v. Prudential Federal Savings and Loan Assn., 767 P.2d 538
(Utah 1988) wherein the Supreme Court found that a 39-day delay at
a critical juncture in the proceedings was not a timely filing.
The court there suggested that 10 days should be ample time to
prepare and file such an affidavit and certificate especially if
29
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a motion to amend and reconsider Judge Anderson's decision.

Only

after an unfavorable decision and rulings denying those motions,
did ARC file its motion to disqualify.

It is well recognized that

an application for the disqualification of a trial judge must be
filed at the earliest opportunity.

The courts generally apply this

rule with strictness against a person who, having a knowledge of
the

facts,

does

not

seek

to

disqualify

the

judge

until

an

unfavorable ruling has been made. See Madsen v. Prudential Federal
Savings

and Loan Assn., 767 P.2d

538, 543

(Utah 1988) .

The

provisions of the rule itself require that the affidavit be filed
as soon as practicable after the bias or prejudice is known.

Such

has not been the case here.
The fact that there existed an agreement wherein stock was
held in an escrow in a transaction between Neal M Sorensen and
Syscom, reasonably should have been known to ARC near the beginning
of this law suit.

The transaction was the subject of inquiry as

early as the time of Neal M Sorensen's deposition on May 1, 1992.
See

deposition

of

Neal

M

Sorensen,

Addendum

A.

Extensive

depositions were taken, materials and documents were produced for
examination at depositions, and interrogatories were answered.
There was ample opportunity to know what is now alleged as the
basis for disqualification.

Even if the first knowledge was in

July of 1995, it can not be said that the motion was timely filed
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when it w a s not filed until montns later, after several
ru] iriqs . The ^<~^jrf
on

i^n

I.

adverse

-"irrect I y rn'.^ci against ARC'S Motion to Recuse,

. •• •

C. The motion to recuse Judge Anderson w a s correctly denied
because Judge Anderson had no actual knowledge of the contract
upon which the Motion to Disqualify is predicated.
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'I'll<°" agreement w a s drafted by Clark B

Allred, representing Neal M iJorensen.
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Judge

John Anderson has been neither attorney

Syscom, Rod Hauer, or Neal M Sorensen.

or

counsel

for

Unknown to him, his partner

Mr. Beaslin agreed to hold stock as a third party escrow agent in
a transaction involving Neal Sorensen and Syscom.

The section

relied upon should not apply to the case at hand.

(R. 1213 and

1214) .
ARC

should

be estopped

from

filing

its Motion

to Recuse

because it waited until after an adverse decision before raising
this issue when all of the facts relating to the stock purchase
agreement were known to ARC prior to the time Judge Anderson issued
his ruling in this case.

ARC is on record of having received a

copy of the agreement prior to the time ARC filed its proposed
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law as was testified to by both
Mr. Stringham and Mr. Hauer at the hearing the Court held in this
case on ARC'S Motion to Enforce a Settlement Agreement, which
hearing was held on the 21st day of August, 1995.
This,

coupled with

the other Motions

filed,

demonstrates

clearly that the Motion to Disqualify was not filed because Judge
John Anderson was prejudice or even that ARC believed the escrow of
stock had any influence on Judge Anderson's decision in the case.
It was simply an effort to avoid paying Syscom for work performed
and to obtain a new trial.

If a ruling favorable to ARC had been

entered there would have been no motion to recuse.
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THE C0URT PR0PERLY REJECTED ARC#S ATTEMPT TQ RE0PEN 0R

0BTAIN

A N E W TRIAL BASED O N EVIDENCE DEVELOPED AFTER THE TRIAL AND
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r e g i s t e r s for both t ujk. a c c o u n t s show w h e r e e v e r y p e n n y of A R C ' S
m o n e y w a s spent:

(E: : 74 ai id 75 ) A R C h a d p o s s e s s i o n of the check

registers long b e f o r e trial , Sy sc ::»i n accoui ite •• :i for a] 1 money placed
in the accounts it had access to and spent additional sums of its
own f u n d s w h i c h c o 11 s t i 11 11 e s p a r t o f i t s c 1 a i m a g a i n s t A R C . (See

34

testimony of Neal M Sorensen and Marie Bagshaw, R. 523-824, Ex. 617, 24-47, 52-55, 63, 65-66, 68, 69, 71-74, 76-77.)
If ARC ran out of money to finish the project, that is simply
a confession that it breached one of its responsibilities under the
Management Agreement.

(Ex. 1 and 75 at 3(a), 3(h), 5(c) 5(d),

5(g) .)
The evidence which ARC asserted as newly discovered or newly
known is essentially the evidence that was before the Court at the
time of the trial.

Additionally, ARC has asserted that it has

sustained consequential damages of approximately $9,000,000.00 that
were not presented at the trial.

(R. 1037, 1038).

ARC'S motion to reopen was also correctly denied

for the

reason that it had ample opportunity to make an accounting and to
argue the meaning of that accounting both at the trial and in its
proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law and failed to do
so.
Furthermore, Paragraph 13 of the Management Agreement, (Ex. 1
and

75)

specifically

exempts

consequential loss or damage.

Syscom

from

liability

for

It states,

"Notwithstanding anything to the contrary in this Management
Agreement, SYSCOM shall not be liable to CELLCOM for any loss
of damage of any nature incurred or suffered by CELLCOM in any
way relating to or arising out of the act or default of
SYSCOM, or any employee of SYSCOM, in the purported
performance or nonperformance of this Management Agreement or
any part hereof, except loss or damage to CELLCOM caused by
SYSCOM's willful act, willful default, gross negligence or
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gross misconduct under this Management Agreement to the extent
to which the same is not recoverable by virtue of the
insurance of CELLCOM. In no event shall SYSCOM be liable for
CELLCOM's loss of profits and/or other consequential loss or
damage, whether or not occasioned or caused by the act,
default or negl igence of SYSCOM, nor shall SYSCOM be in any
way liable for any act, default
or negligence, willful or
otherwise, of any other independent contractor employed for
the purpose of providing services to CELLCOM.
SYSCOM
undertakes to use due care in the context of the available
labor force in the selection of persons, if any, hired for the
purpose of providing services to CELLCOM, but: SYSCOM shall
have no obligation, responsibility or liability of any nature
whatsoever for any act or omission, tortuous or otherwise, of
any person so hired.
Except as otherwise set forth above,
SYSCOM shall nc* be liable for. and "ELLCOM shall] indemnify
and he":.d SYSCOM harmless from and against, any and all
damage;.-,
liabilities,
losses,
claims
actions,
suits,
proceedings, costs or expenses -including reasonable billed
attorneys' fees and expenses) of whatever kind and nature
imposed on, incurred, by or asserted against SYSCOM in any way
relating to or arising out of this Management Agreement or the
design, development, construction, operation or management of
f. f i; '•: r:. '• r ' W j v~f=* 1 i n p

Further,

n o ! 1 n ] ;vr

^rpk r\ i r\

c; wc: t" p r p

in

t he

DRP]VfTT

A P T7 A

i i A-:. • ] a i m s c o n s e q u e n t id 1 carnages c o n n e c t e d w; th

its P e n n s y l v a n i a operation.. s-ioj- won id N - -:J 'natter f o r f 11 inn of a
new

..!.--;'•:. ; . :. t\-. :•• :/

.>

:.

. •; - •

for e tl i€ (.' u-- , -o ..o-

such losses would ha\--: to have taken place a t er the filing of this
Complaint and ccild

*ot have been made r--• r \ of the trial even if

There is ;;othm - fair about startinq -n . over again or; \ six
year old case to n

• " b-'-o*- - — a r onese'l *- into a position it

wishes it could havt- ,.;>.;ta,n(

. .^.. ...

. ...u.

Rule 5 9 or • ne "tah Rules of Civil Procedure, sets forth the
groi m d s *'

-< -

i a II a s £0] ] < in *s
36

(a) Grounds.
Subject to the provisions of Rule 61, a new
trial may be granted to all or any of the parties and on all
or part of the issues, for any of the following causes;
provided, however, that on a motion for a new trial in an
action tried without a jury, the court may open the judgment
if one has been entered, take additional testimony, amend
findings of fact and conclusions of law or make new findings
and conclusions, and direct the entry of a new judgment:
(4) Newly discovered evidence, material for the party
making the application, which he could not, with
reasonable diligence, have discovered and produced at the
trial.
The law is clear that a trial court has no discretion to grant
a new trial absent a showing of one of the grounds specified in the
Rule 59a.

Tangaro v. Marrero, 13 Utah 2d 290, 373 P.2d 390 (1962) .

Absent a showing of at least one of the circumstances specified in
Subdivision

(a) of Rule 59, a trial court has no discretion to

grant a new trial.

Moon Lake Elec. Ass'n v. Ultrasvstems, W.

Constructors, Inc., 767 P.2d 125, 128 (Utah App. 1988); Schindler
v. Schindler, 776 P. 2d 84, 89 (Utah App. 1989) . The law is further
clear that a motion for a new trial or amended judgment cannot be
based on facts occurring subsequent to the trial; newly discovered
evidence must relate to facts which were in existence at the time
of trial.

In re Disconnection of Certain Territory, 668 P.2d 544,

549 (Utah 1983) . A party is not entitled to a new trial where the
evidentiary

matters

termed

as new

were

reasonable

and

proper

subjects of discovery and could have been obtained by the exercise
of ordinary diligence.

Powers v. Gene's Bldq. Materials, Inc., 567
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its money for services rendered and materials supplied for more
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than six years now while ARC has filed motions, made appeals, and
engaged in other maneuvers to keep from paying its just debt.

The

practical effect of granting ARC'S motion would be to postpone for
another four or five years a final conclusion to this matter.

If

an accounting was not completed at the time of the original trial,
that was not the fault of Syscom.
IV.

SYSCOM IS ENTITLED TO ITS ATTORNEYS FEES AND COSTS AS
AWARDED BY THE DISTRICT COURT.
Paragraph

13

of

the Management

Agreement

is

a

somewhat

unusual, but all encompassing provision of the contract between the
parties.

It provides that ARC

"shall indemnify and hold Syscom harmless from and against any
and all damages, liabilities, losses, claims, actions, suits,
proceedings, costs, or expenses", ("including reasonable
billed attorneys fees and expenses") of what ever kind and
nature imposed on, incurred by or asserted by Syscom in any
way relating to or arising out of this Management Agreement or
the design development construction operation or management of
the non wire line cellular radio system in the permit area".
This is not the usual attorney fee provision which states that
a defaulting party or prevailing party shall pay the non-defaulting
parties attorneys fees in the event of enforcement.

This agreement

drafted by ARC was specifically calculated to hold Syscom harmless
from any claims or liabilities and to reimburse it for attorneys
fees and expenses of "whatever kind and nature".

It was agreed to

by the parties and should be recognized now by the court that
attorneys fees and expenses for small companies like Syscom can
39

negate the value of any judgment they may obtain in an action such
as this.
The parties further agreed in paragraph 14 of the Management
Agreement
Agreement

that all disputes
would

arbitration.

be

settled

in connection with the Management
by

means

of

mandatory

binding

ARC ignored that covenant to which it had agreed and

filed this action against

Syscom.

Syscom

is entitled

to the

benefit to its bargain embodied in paragraph 13 of the Management
Agreement by being reimbursed for its attorneys fees and costs
regardless of whether it is the prevailing party.
Additionally, Section 38-1-18 Utah Code Annotated, part of the
mechanics lien statute provides:
In any action to enforce any lien under this chapter the
successful party shall be entitled to recover a reasonable
attorneys' fee, to be fixed by the court, which shall be taxed
as costs in the action.
Syscom is the prevailing party at this time.
Judgment against ARC favors Syscom.

The award of a

Under the lien statute, Syscom

has prevailed as indicated by the trial court.

It cannot be said

in good faith that ARC has been the successful party in Syscom's
attempt to foreclose its mechanics liens in this matter.

The fact

that ARC has employed every legal maneuver it could think to avoid
paying Syscom for its services and materials contributed to put ARC
in business should not be held against Syscom.
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The court had before it affidavits, the testimony of counsel
for ARC, and time records showing work performed to justify the
attorneys fees.

The trial court and this court should sustain the

trial court in its conclusion that attorneys fees are due and
owing.
CONCLUSION
This Court should sustain the lower court's decision and award
costs and attorneys fees on appeal.
DATED this

(3H~ day of December, 1996.
McKEACHNIE & ALLRED, P.C.
Attorneys for Defendants/Appellees
BY:
rleQ FT McKeachnie
BY:
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MAILING CERTIFICATE
Gayle

F.

McKeachnie,

attorney

for

Defendants/Appellees

certifies that he served the attached BRIEF OF DEFENDANTS/APPELLEES
SYSTEMS COMMUNICATION CORPORATION AND NEAL M SORENSEN upon counsel
by placing

two true and correct copies thereon in an envelop

addressed to:
Mr. Andrew M. Morse
Snow Christensen & Martineau
10 Exchange Place, #1100
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
and deposited the same, sealed, with first class postage prepaid
thereon, in the United States Mail at Vernal, Utah, on the
of December, 1996.
Gayle R. McKeachnie
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR UNITAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

AMERICAN RURAL CELLULAR
INC., a Delaware corporation,
Plaintiff,

;

vs.
| No. 910800064 CN
SYSTEMS COMMUNICATIONS
CORPORATION, a Utah
corporation, and NEAL
M. SORENSEN,

;

Defendants.
SYSTEMS COMMUNICATIONS
CORPORATION, a Utah
corporation,
Third-Party
Plaintiff,

vs.
MOTOROLA, INC.,
Third-Party
Defendant.
DEPOSITION UPON ORAL EXAMINATION
OF
NEAL VL. SORENSEN
Taken Pursuant to Notice and the Utah Rules of
Civil Procedure
Friday, May 1, 1992, 9:20 a.m.
At the offices of:
Gayle F. McKeachnie
Attorney at Law
363 E. Main Street
Vernal, Utah
By:

Peggy Grover, R.P.R., CM., Notary Public

Associated Professional Reporters
10 West Broadway / Suite 200 / Salt Lake City, Utah 84101

1
2

A P P E A R A N C E S :
For the Plaintiff:

Don R. Schow, Esq.
PRINCE, YEATES & GELDZAHLER
Attorneys at Law
City Centre I, Suite 900
175 East Fourth South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

For the Defendant:

Gayle F. McKeachnie, Esq
Attorney at Law
363 E. Main Street
Vernal, Utah 84078

Also Present:

Dennis O'Neill
Rodney Hauer
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I N D E X
Neal M. Sorensen
Examination by Mr. Sch
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Page
3

Description
List of outstanding invoices
Service Report/Work Ticket No. 14539
Service Report/Work Ticket No. 14540
Service Report/Work Ticket No. 14541
Map of Utah 5 service area (retained)
Copy of Draft No. 1096, $19,730.65
Invoice No. 16316 tc> American Rural
Invoice No. 15442 tc> American Rural
Invoice No. 15426 tc> American Rural
Account Statement, 3 -2-91, Systems
Communications
Account Statement, 3 -21-91, Systems
Communications
Copy of Check Register

Page
58
59
63
63
82
106
106
116
116
122
123
126

VERNAL, UTAH, FRIDAY, MAY 1, 1992, 9:30 A.M.
1

NEAL M. SORENSEN,

2

having first been duly and

3

legally sworn, was examined

4

and testified on his oath as

5

follows:

6
7
8
9
10
11
12

MR. SCHOW:

Let the record show that this is the

place and time set for the deposition of Mr. Neal Sorensen in
the matter of American Rural Cellular, Inc., a Delaware
corporation versus Systems Communications Corportion, and Neal
M. Sorensen. The deposition is being held in the office of Mr.
Gayle McKeachnie, and we appreciate his willingness to let us
do it here.

13

EXAMINATION
14

BY MR. SCHOW:

Q. Would you please state your name

15

for the record.
16

A.

Neal M. Sorensen.

Q.

And what is your address, Mr. Sorensen?

A.

715 West 3300 North, Vernal, Utah.

Q.

Where are you currently employed?

A.

I work for a company called Geotech Services.

Q.

What do you do for Geotech?

A.

I am a contract technician to Chevron.

Q.

What are your duties as a contract technician?

A.

I maintain two-way radio equipment, microwave radio

17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

COMPUTERIZED TRANSCRIPT

equipment, supervisory control and data acquisition equipment,
telephone

equipment, computers, electronic

communications

equipment.
Q.

Are

you

currently

associated

with

Systems

Communications Corporation?
A.

Please clarify what you mean by associated.

Q.

What is your current relationship with Systems

Communications Corporation?
A.

I

hold

no

stock

in

Systems

Communications

Corporation.
Q.

Have you owned stock in the past?

A.

I have.

Q.

And up to what date did you own stock?

A.

I think in February we transferred that stock.

Q.

When you say "we".

A.

Me.

Q.

To?

A.

To an escrow account.

Q.

And what was the purpose of the escrow account?

A.

Until I was paid. Until the completed payments were

I transferred my stock in February.

made for that stock, it would be held in escrow.
Q.

What was the reason for your decision to sell your

stock or transfer your stock?
A.

There were several reasons.

that it was time for a change.

Rod and I just felt

I had another opportunity,

COMPUTERIZED TRANSCRIPT

3

business was slowing down. I think those were the main
1

reasons.

Reduce the overhead on the company.

2

Q.

And this new opportunity you mentioned

is the

3

Geotech situation you currently have?
4

A.

Yes.

It is a good job.

Q.

We kind of started backwards here. I would like to

5
6

go back and have you review for us, if you would, your
7

educational background, first of all high school, and any post
8

high school education you have had.
9

A.

I haven't had much, in fact, I don't think I hold

10

any college credit.
11

Q.

Then tell us about the training that you have had,

12

vocational, or technical training that you have had.
13

A.

I assume you just mean with regard to my present

14

employment.
15

Q.

Any technical training that you have had.

I would

16

like to get an idea of your general background.
17

fB

A.

I began working for a company here in Vernal called

Industrial Communications, I don't know, some 16 years ago, 17
19

years ago now maybe. The only training that I had had in this
20

field was what I took in high school that was remotely
21

related.

At that time I received on the job training and

22

attended a few seminars working for that company. Then I went
23

to work for a company called Mack Communications and received
24

on the job training and technical training on
25
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